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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 900497-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Priority No. 2 
CHANNAN S. SINGH, * 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, five 
counts, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), with one count enhanced pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1001 and 1002 (1990) (habitual criminal), in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Must a "writing" be complete before it constitutes 
a forgery under the Utah forgery statute? Because the issue 
presents a question of law, it is reviewed for its correctness. 
Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the trial court improperly refuse to instruct 
the jury on defendant's theories of the case? An appeal 
challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents a 
question of law. Carpet Barn v. State of Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). The trial court's legal conclusion is not 
accorded any particular deference and is reviewed for its 
correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
516 (Utah), cert, denied.. Ill S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion to dismiss the forgery charge on the ground that the 
forgery statute was more applicable to the case than the 
prohibited use of a license statute, urged by defendant? Because 
the issue presents a question of law, the trial court's legal 
conclusion is afforded no deference and is reviewed under a 
"correction of error" standard. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 
327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Channan S. Singh, was charged by information 
with 5 counts of forgery, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1990) and one count for being a habitual criminal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 1-5). At the preliminary 
hearing, defendant made a motion to dismiss the charges on the 
ground that permits sold by defendant were facially incomplete 
and thus incapable of facilitating a fraud pursuant to section 
76-6-501 (R. 3, 22-26). 
Defendant also alleged at the preliminary hearing that 
the motor vehicle code, Utah Code Ann., Title 41, governed the 
alteration of driver's licenses. The Third Circuit Court denied 
the motion and defendant was bound over to the Third Judicial 
District Court (R. 3). In that court defendant made a motion to 
quash the bindover order on the same grounds previously alleged, 
and the court denied the motion (R. 21-26). One week before 
trial and immediately before and after trial defendant renewed 
his motion to dismiss the information, again on the same grounds 
previously alleged, and again the trial court denied the motion 
(R. 31-34; Transcript of Proceedings of July 10, 1990, hereafter 
"T." 2-19 and 81-85). Following trial the court rejected 
defendant's proposed jury instruction over defendant's exceptions 
(R. 110-118). Defendant was convicted on all counts at trial and 
sentenced to a term of not less than seven years on all counts 
(R. 132-36). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 27, 1989, West Valley City detective Holly 
Wright, assigned to the Metro Sting Operation, went to 4014 
Benview Drive to buy a driver's license from an unnamed 
individual. That individual was not there, but defendant was, 
and he sold two Driver License Temporary Counter Permits 
(hereinafter "permits") to detective Wright for $100.00 (T. 54-57 
and State's Exhibit 1, Appendix B). On each of these permits the 
director's and examiner's names, the results of examination, a 
"No Rests" ["No Restriction"] notation and expiration dates had 
already been filled in (T. 57-58). 
On December 7, 1989, detective Wright again met 
defendant to purchase two more permits, this time at 912 East 
Second South, defendant's apartment (T. 59). These two permits 
were also filled in with the names of the examiner and director, 
results of examination, a "No Rests" ["No Restriction"] notation 
and an expiration date (T. 59-61 and State's Exhibit 2, Appendix 
B). Defendant sold these two permits to detective Wright for 
$100.00 (T. 60). 
On cross examination detective Wright testified that 
she had not seen defendant fill in any portion of these four 
permits and that they were already filled in as described when 
sold to her (T. 67-69). She testified that she did not know if 
the signatures were actually those of Department of Public Safety 
personnel, nor did she know who the director of the driver's 
license service was (T. 69-71). She also testified that each of 
the four permits were not complete as to the name, height, 
weight, sex, eye color, hair color and date of birth of the 
person to whom it issued and that the permits purchased on 
December 7, 1989 were invalid in the condition in which she 
received them from defendant (T. 67-69). However, on redirect 
examination, detective Wright testified that defendant instructed 
her on how to fill out the permits by putting in any name and 
nine-digit driver's license number (T. 72). 
On December 12, 1989, detective Wright met with 
defendant one last time at the undercover location, 2403 South 
2700 West, to purchase a pad of fifteen permits (T. 61-62). 
Defendant delivered the blank permits, left and then later 
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returned to receive payment from another undercover agent (T. 
63), When defendant returned detective Wright had been joined by 
detective Carroll Mays of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
(T. 63 and 73-74). 
In the course of his discussion about the price for the 
blank permits, detective Mays testified that defendant told him 
that defendant normally sold this type of permit for $50.00 each, 
that "[the permits] worked fine and people had used them for I.D. 
and such with no problem" (T. 75-76). Thereafter, at detective 
Mays' request, defendant filled in the director's and examiner's 
signatures and the results of examination section on one of the 
permits (T. 76-77 and State's Exhibit 3, Addendum B). Detective 
Mays also testified that since the "scam" involved his reselling 
the permits, defendant told him to put in the name, address, 
physical description and other information and to make the 
signatures just as defendant had (T. 77). After receiving those 
instructions from defendant, detective Mays paid defendant 
$400.00 (T. 77). 
On cross examination detective Mays also testified that 
the permit filled in for him by defendant, without the identity 
of the licensees, was not valid (T. 79). 
Defendant did not testify. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Common law crimes have been abolished in Utah, and thus 
the crime of forgery is determined by the plain meaning of the 
forgery statute. Further, the Criminal Code is to be liberally 
construed in order to effect the object of the forgery statute. 
The Model Penal Code, upon which the forgery statute is based, 
assigns criminal culpability to one who merely makes or transfers 
a writing purporting to be that of another with knowledge that he 
is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone. The 
commentaries to the Model Penal Code clearly imply that a "non-
material" making of a writing with intent either to defraud or to 
facilitate the perpetration of a fraud by anyone who will 
complete the execution of the scheme is sufficient to make out 
the crime of forgery. The uncontroverted evidence was that 
defendant believed himself to be assisting in a scheme to pass 
the permits to persons who would then fill in the remaining blank 
spaces and sell them to others for illegitimate purposes. 
Even if a common law requirement pertained in Utah, 
that a writing must purport to have "legal efficacy" before it 
can constitute a forgery, an exception to the common law, 
allowing conviction for forgery even where other steps are needed 
to be taken in order to perfect the writing, should apply. This 
exception is implicitly bolstered by the Commentary to the Model 
Penal Code which advises that forgery is committed when the actor 
makes the writing and gives it to another to execute the 
fraudulent scheme. Given the more expansive reach of the Model 
Penal Code in assigning culpability, there was sufficient 
evidence to support defendant's conviction. 
POINT II 
Defendant was not entitled to lesser included offense 
instructions on any of his three alternative theories: (1) 
attempted forgery, (2) prohibited use of a license or (3) 
receiving stolen property. A jury might reasonably have inferred 
from the evidence that defendant was guilty of attempted forgery 
and prohibited use of a license. However, the evidence did not 
provide a rational basis for convicting defendant of receiving 
stolen property because there was no evidence of any kind 
indicating the origin of the permits or how defendant obtained 
them. In any event, given that the permits "made" and/or 
"transferred" were actionable writings under the statute, there 
was no evidence providing a rational basis for acquitting 
defendant of forgery. 
POINT III 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss. The forgery and prohibited use of a license statute 
apply to different criminal conduct. Also, because defendant 
"transferred" a writing, conduct not provided for under the 
prohibited use of a license statute, the forgery statute was more 
specific to defendant's criminal conduct. Thus, defendant was 
properly charged with forgery. 
POINT IV 
The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant is guilty of attempted forgery. Therefore, should this 
Court determine that there is insufficient evidence to convict 
defendant of forgery because the permits were not complete, this 
Court may vacate and set aside the forgery conviction and remand 
the case for the entry of judgment of conviction for attempted 
forgery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH FORGERY STATUTE, BROADLY AND 
REASONABLY CONSTRUED, EMBRACES DEFENDANT'S 
TRANSFER OF PARTIALLY COMPLETED PERMITS, 
BASED ON THE INTENT AND POLICY OF THE MODEL 
PENAL CODE ON WHICH THE STATUTE IS BASED, 
Defendant claims that the Utah forgery statute contains 
a common law requirement that a "writing" purport to have "legal 
efficacy", in order for it to be a forgery. Thus, defendant 
argues, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of forgery 
because the permits he sold to police undercover agents were void 
for lack of certain licensee identifying information. Under the 
Utah Criminal Code this claim is untenable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1990) provides: 
Common law crimes are abolished and no 
conduct is a crime unless made so by this 
code, other applicable statute or ordinance. 
See also State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1982) (common 
law inapplicable as determinant of intent necessary to prove 
attempted first degree murder). 
See also State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), a 
bad check case in which this Court held that an alleged common 
law requirement that the essential elements of the crime were 
restricted to the mens rea and actus reus of the perpetrator was 
inoperable where the relevant statute also explicitly 
incorporated the drawee's refusal to make payment an express 
element of the crime. In so holding, this Court noted (1) the 
common law had been abolished by statute; (2) some jurisdictions 
had incorporated the common law as argued by the defendant, but 
that Utah had not; (3) defendant had given no support for his 
contention that the statute was a mere codification of the common 
law; and (4) that in determining the essential elements of the 
charged offense, the Court was compelled to follow the 
unambiguous language of the statute, rather than the requisites 
of the common law. Id. at 1231. 
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In this case, defendant simply asserts the common law 
requirement that a document be legally effective in order to 
constitute a forgery. He provides no authority or argument 
indicating that section 76-6-501 codifies the common law as to 
"legal efficacy." The State has been unable to locate any cases 
under section 76-6-501, or its predecessors, that have even 
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referred to "legal efficacy" as an element of forgery. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1990), under which defendant 
was charged, provides, in pertinent part: 
Even if there remained in the Utah forgery statute a vestige of 
the common law of forgery requiring that forged writings purport 
to have apparent legal efficacy, such rule would not exculpate 
defendant in this case. "An instrument may be the subject of 
forgery even though the taking of other steps was required before 
the instrument could be perfected, and such steps were not 
taken." 4 C.E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 510 (14th ed. 
1981); see also id. at § 512 at 147. Examples of this exception 
to the general common law rule are found in Clay v. State, 57 
Ala. App. 630, 632-33, 330 So. 2d 453, 455 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975) 
(savings withdrawal slip lacking savings account number still 
possessed apparent legal efficacy in forgery conviction); Hall v. 
State, 31 Ala. App. 455, 18 So. 2d 572, 573-74 (Ala. Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 245 Ala. 455, 18 So. 2d (Ala. 1944) (forged 
appearance bond possessed apparent legal efficacy even though the 
further step of applying a signature would have to be taken in 
order to perfect it). 
Defendant cites State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 
1988), in support of his claim. The defendant in that case was 
prosecuted under a statute which made criminal the making or 
altering of any public document or any instrument which purports 
to be a public document. The case clearly stands for the 
proposition that a public document must purport to have legal 
efficacy in order to constitute a forgery. However, the 
documents at issue were completely blank driver's license forms, 
obviously lacking even the semblance of apparent legal efficacy, 
and so ineligible for the application of the exception to the 
common law, discussed above. Moreover, the Iowa penal code is 
not based on the Model Penal Code as is the criminal code of 
Utah. Thus, neither the abolition of the common law crimes nor 
the policy interests expressed by the drafters of the Model Penal 
Code were at issue in the case. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with 
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge 
that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another 
without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that 
the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether 
the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time 
or place or in a numbered sequence other 
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy 
of an original when no such original 
existed, 
(2) As used in this section "writing" 
includes printing or any other method of 
recording information, checks, tokens, 
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of 
value, right, privilege, or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second 
degree if the writing is or purports to be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any 
other instrument or writing issued~by a 
government, or any agency thereof. 
In contradistinction to forgery statutes of other 
jurisdictions, section 76-6-501 does not require that the forged 
4 
writing purport to have "legal efficacy." Nor does the statute 
require that the writing even be complete on its face in order to 
constitute forgery. 
The jury was instructed as to all five counts of forgery under 
the relevant, operative terms of subsections (l)(b), (2) and 
(3)(a) (R. 101-111). 
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-10 (Repl. Pamp 1984); La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 14.72 (West 1986). 
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The source of section 76-6-501 is N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 638.1. Both the Utah and New Hampshire forgery statutes are 
plainly modelled after the Model Penal Code's forgery section. 
The Model Penal Code strongly suggests that the making 
of an incomplete document, in appropriate circumstances, 
constitutes forgery. In discussing the conduct embraced by the 
crime of forgery, the drafters of the Model Penal Code 
deliberately omitted a "materiality" element, commenting: 
Section 224.1 does not contain a 
"materiality" element. The requirement of a 
purpose to defraud or injure or, 
alternatively, of knowledge of facilitating 
fraud by another is an adequate measure of 
the propriety of applying criminal sanctions. 
The addition of a "materiality" element would 
entail litigation of the sort that has 
occurred with the perjury offense without the 
compensating advantage of focusing upon an 
essential ingredient of liability. One who 
perpetrates or intends to perpetrate a fraud 
or other injury by making a non-material 
alteration should be judged, as in other 
forgery cases, by the scope of the harm and 
the nature of the altered instrument. 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 224.1 comment at 298 
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (emphasis added). 
The commentaries to the Model Penal Code also strongly 
suggest that by adding the alternative mens rea, i.e. that the 
defendant acts "with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or 
injury to be perpetrated by anyone," the drafters intended to 
reach defendants who had not themselves completed the crime by 
L.D. Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline, Pt. 5 at 190 (1st ed. 
1973). 
Model Penal Code § 224.1 (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 
1985) (see Appendix A). 
* * 
passing the forged writing: 
This alternative mens rea was added after the 
tentative draft in order to make it clear 
that a forger commits an offense even though 
he does not defraud the person to whom he 
sells or passes the forged writings as where 
the transferee takes with knowledge of the 
forgery for the purpose of passing the 
writings as authentic. Thus, forgery will be 
committed in the common situation where the 
actor makes or alters the writing and gives 
it to another to execute the fraudulent 
scheme. 
Id. at 299-300 (citation omitted). 
Utah's penal statutes should be broadly construed 
"according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice 
and to effect the objects of the law and the general purposes of 
Section 76-1-104." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1990). In State 
v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), the court broadly 
construed the criminal simulation statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-
518 (1990), to include baseball mitts within its terms in the 
face of the defendant's claim that the statute failed to specify 
the type of goods in question and that similar criminal 
simulation statutes had been interpreted narrowly as covering 
only unique chattels, such as antiques or paintings. Quoting 
from a similar case in New York, the court rejected the 
defendant's argument, adopting the Model Penal Code's view that 
its fraudulent simulation section embraced objects other than 
unique chattels. Id. at 192. 
In State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1989), the 
court considered whether the receiving stolen property statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990), embraced property that was not 
actually stolen. Relying on the Model Penal Code (as well as 
1 O 
other authorities), the court determined that property received 
by an accused need not be stolen in order to criminalize 
otherwise culpable conduct, ^d. at 1170-1173. The manner in 
which the court developed the rationale for its decision, whereby 
conceivably non-culpable conduct was found to be within the 
statute's purview, is instructive in this case: 
Modern criminal jurisprudence has a very 
clear bias toward punishing an actor's intent 
instead of simply punishing the manifest 
criminality or outwardly criminal act. Our 
Legislature has expressed that its concern is 
directed more toward subjective criminality 
than toward manifest criminality by stating 
in [Utah Code Ann.] § 76-1-104(2) [(1953, as 
amended)]: 
The Provisions of this code shall be 
construed in accordance with these general 
purposes. 
. . . . 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and 
mental state which constitute each offense 
and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal. 
. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) Section 76-2-101 expresses 
the same legislative purpose: 
No person is guilty of an offense unless 
his conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence 
with respect to each element of the 
offense as the definition of the offense 
requires; 
. . . 
See State v. Elton, Utah, 680 P.2d 727 
(1984). Sections 76-1-104 and 76-2-101 
demonstrate a legislative desire not to 
punish manifestly criminal acts that are not 
accompanied by a subjective mental state to 
do wrong. The converse is also true. We see 
the Legislature's desire to punish subjective 
criminality so long as it is linked with some 
otherwise harmless corroborative act that 
demonstrates the firmness of the actor's 
criminal resolve. Examples of this are [Utah 
Code Ann.] § 76-4-101(3)(b) [(1953, as 
amended)], which denies an impossibility 
defense to an attempt charge, and [Utah Code 
_1 0__ 
Ann.] § 76-2-304(1) [(1953, as amended)], 
which states that a mistake of fact is a 
defense only if it disproves the culpable 
mental state. Likewise, in the theft by 
receiving statute the Legislature expressed 
its desire to prohibit subjective criminality 
(the culpable mental state of desiring to 
receive stolen property) when it is 
accompanied by an otherwise harmless act 
(receiving property that is not actually 
stolen). The interpretation that the subject 
property need not be stolen and that the 
focus is on the actor's mental state is in 
harmony with the modern trend of criminal 
jurisprudence. See generally G. Fletcher, 
Rethinking Criminal Law ch. 3 (1978). 
Id. at 1172 (emphasis added). 
In this case, defendant's mental state clearly 
evidenced criminal intent. The completion of the permits was 
merely the last remaining act in a fraud to be perpetuated by 
others, all of which was contemplated by defendant in the act of 
selling the permits. On the critical issue, that the permits 
were incomplete and thus void, officer Wright testified that 
defendant instructed her on how to fill out the permits by 
putting in any name and nine-digit driver's license number she 
chose (T. 72). Officer Mays testified even more particularly to 
defendant's facilitating the perpetration of a fraud by having 
another complete the writings: 
A [Officer Mays] What this is a Utah State 
Department of Public Safety temporary 
driver's license. Says driver's license, 
temporary counter permit. 
Q [State's Attorney] Have you seen that 
document before? 
A Yes. I have. 
Q And when was that? 
_ 1 A ^ 
A When I purchased it from Mr. Singh and he 
filled it out. 
Q What was the circumstances of him filling 
it out? 
A He had shown me a driver's license pretty 
similar to that that he carried in the 
sleeve, cigarette pocket of his nylon flight 
jacket. He had pulled it out and showed it 
to me, showed me how it was filled out. And 
he said it works just fine. He drove a truck 
and he'd been stopped and no problems. I 
said, well, you know, [I am] not going to buy 
these. I don't really know how to fill these 
out. Never having dealt with them, and he 
filled in the director's signature down at 
the bottom and the examiner's signature in 
two places on the right-hand side of the 
document. 
Q Where did he physically fill that one out? 
A Uh—I was sitting in my office at the desk 
and he basically perched on the edge of the 
desk, and leaded over with his pen and filled 
them out, right in front of me. 
Q Did you observe him actually fill that 
out? 
A Yes, sir. I did. 
Q And what other identifying marks are there 
on that, is there any examiner's score? 
A He has filled in part of the result of the 
examination section, and additionally, he 
instructed me how to fill out the remainder 
of it. 
Q What was his instruction? 
A Since the scam, if you will, that I was 
going to resell them, he told me to put in 
the name, and address and physical 
description, et cetera, on the left side, and 
make the signatures like he had made them. 
Q After you received that from him, did you 
at that time make payment? 
A Yes. I did. I gave him $400 in cash. 
Q And what did Mr. Singh do then? 
A Pocketed the money and he left. 
(T. at 76-77) (emphasis added). 
By instructing officers Wright and Mays on how to 
complete the permits, with knowledge that the completed permits 
were then to be resold, defendant fully directed a fraudulent 
scheme involving the transfer of completed writings. Employing 
the view adopted in Pappasf that the core of criminal conduct 
lies in the intent to do harm, and particularly in view of the 
Model Penal Code's strong suggestions that a non-material, i.e. 
less than complete, making of a writing constitutes forgery in an 
appropriate case, this Court should determine that defendant's 
partial making of a writing expressly intended to be completed by 
others, all with the intent to defraud, is conduct embraced by 
section 76-6-501. 
Defendant also argues that in selling only incomplete 
permits his crime may be nothing more than an attempted forgery. 
In Pappas, the court considered the possibility that the 
receiving stolen property statute did not literally require that 
the subject property be stolen, suggesting that the defendant 
might be guilty of nothing more than an attempt. In 
distinguishing the attempt statute the court noted that the 
"[receiving stolen property statute required] the union of the 
culpable mental state and all the steps within the actor's power 
to complete the intended theft." Id. at 1173 (emphasis added). 
In so reasoning the court noted that while the change in the 
statute offended common law thinking, the legislature had 
abolished common law crimes and was free to proscribe the 
defendant's class of activity, that of being a known fence. 
Ibid. 
The policy behind the forgery statute is to fulfill the 
public's need to have "a guarantee of authenticity of instruments 
and records upon which the community can rely in important 
7 
transactions." In this case# defendant took all the steps that 
were within his power to effect a fraudulent scheme. Only the 
entry of certain information, which could only have been made by 
persons other than defendant if the scheme were to be completely 
effected, remained. Defendant was fully aware of and intended 
this final step, as the uncontroverted testimony of detectives 
Wright and Mays demonstrated. The policy and intent of section 
o 
76-6-501 clearly embrace such conduct. The evidence was thus 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 224.1 comment at 283 
(Official Drafts and Revised Comments 1980); see also Model Penal 
Code § 224.1 explanatory note at 154 ("A separate forgery offense 
is needed in order to recognize the special effectiveness of 
forgery as a means of undermining public confidence in important 
symbols of commerce and as a means of perpetrating widespread 
fraud"). 
g 
Defendant, while arguing his motion to dismiss just prior to 
trial, acknowledged a sufficient culpable intent to defraud under 
section 76-6-501. In arguing that the "writing" must purport to 
have "legal efficacy," defendant stated: 
MR. LOYD [Defense counsel]: I don't see how 
a writing can be used even in the sense of 
facilitating a fraud if it still has on its 
face been legally efficacious. It may be 
that Mr, Singh was facilitating a fraud but 
not directly and not even indirectly. He was 
going to be the person who holds it out to 
someone to use to be facilitating a fraud. 
(T. 14) (emphasis added). 
i •»_ 
fully sufficient to convict defendant of forgery. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS ON ANY OF HIS 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR 
ACQUITTING DEFENDANT OF FORGERY. 
Due process entitles a defendant to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case. Beck v. Alabama/ 447 U.S. 
625, 637 (1980); State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984). 
But, this right is not absolute; it is limited by the evidence 
presented at trial. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 
1983). Thus, where as here, a defendant requests an instruction 
on a lesser included offense, the trial court is obligated to 
give the requested instruction only where there is: 
a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense." 
Id. at 159. It is not sufficient that the evidence simply 
The remaining elements necessary to defendant's forgery 
conviction, namely defendant's transfer of writings purportedly 
those of the government, were satisfied by uncontroverted 
evidence. Defendant sold five permits to police undercover agents 
on three separate occasions (T. 54-60 and 79). All of the 
permits bore the names of persons other than defendant, 
purportedly those of Department of Public Safety examiners and 
directors (State's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3; Appendix B). Defendant 
has admitted that he was not authorized to act on behalf of the 
State (Appellant's Brief at 16). 
In Baker, the court ruled that the defendant, upon his 
request, is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction if, 
based on the evidence at trial, (1) the offense charged and the 
lesser included offense are related so that some of their 
statutory elements overlap, and where evidence of the greater 
offense included proof of some or all of those overlapping 
elements; and (2) there is a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense, Ijd. at 159. 
In this case, defendant requested lesser included 
i o_ 
provides a basis to convict of the lesser offense, it must 
"simultaneously" provide a rational basis for the jury to acquit 
of the greater- State v. Crick# 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983) 
(defendant not entitled to lesser included offense instruction 
where acquittal of second degree murder necessarily required 
acquittal of manslaughter); State v. Pitts, 726 P.2d 113, 116 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (evidence not so ambiguous as to be 
susceptible to interpretation that defendant was not guilty of 
burglary but guilty of theft); State v. Speerf 750 P.2d 186, 190-
91 (Utah, 1988) (lesser included offense instructions on assault 
and burglary properly denied where supporting evidence did not 
negate elements of aggravated assault and aggravated burglary). 
In this case there was no evidence providing a rational 
basis for acquitting defendant of forgery. The State's theory at 
trial was that defendant, with intent to defraud or to facilitate 
a fraud to be perpetrated by another, transferred writings 
purporting to be issued by the government (T. 93-96). Defendant 
did not take the stand or call any witnesses. Other than 
eliciting from the State's witnesses that the permits were void 
as sold to police detectives, defendant offered no evidence at 
all to refute the State's case. If, therefore, this Court should 
Cont. offense instructions on attempted forgery, prohibited 
use of a license and receiving stolen property. The State 
concedes that with respect to attempted forgery the first prong 
of Baker is satisfied. The State does not concede that with 
respect to receiving stolen property and prohibited use of a 
license, the first prong of Baker is satisfied. However, the 
State has not further briefed its contention on this latter point 
because defendant's proffered instructions, on all of his three 
theories, fail to satisfy the second prong of Baker, as discussed 
below. 
find that the partially completed permits transferred by 
defendant are actionable writings under section 76-6-501, as 
argued above, then this Court must also find that defendant was 
not entitled to lesser included offense instructions on any of 
his alternate theories. 
Defendant also suggests that even if his requested 
instructions do not qualify as lesser included offense 
instructions, he is nonetheless entitled to have them considered 
by the jury. The suggestion misconstrues the law. To the extent 
that defendant argues that his lesser included offense 
instructions are alternative theories, his argument is 
nonetheless insupportable under the Baker standard. It is an 
elevation of form over substance for defendant to suggest that he 
may escape a Baker analysis merely by denoting alternative 
substantive crimes as other than lesser included offenses. Each 
of the three cases defendant cites in support of his argument 
concern instructions going only to limited aspects of that 
defendant's particular defense, rather than the separate and 
entire criminal offenses offered by defendant. 
In support, defendant cites Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 
458-59 (Utah 1981) (trial court's refusal of jury instructions 
relating specifically to negligent character of defendant's 
conduct harmless error at most); State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 
695 (Utah 1980) (defendant entitled to jury instruction on issue 
of self-defense); and State y. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550-51 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (refusal to give instruction on specific witness's 
credibility not an abuse of discretion in light of general 
instruction on jury's duty to evaluate credibility). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED FOR FORGERY 
WHICH PROSCRIBED DIFFERENT CONDUCT THAN 
PROHIBITED USE OF A LICENSE STATUTE AND WHICH 
WAS MORE SPECIFIC TO DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT. 
To the extent that defendant's argument, that the trial 
court improperly refused to submit his alternative theories to 
the jury, is actually in response to the trial court's denial of 
his motion to dismiss, it is mistaken. 
At trial defendant moved to dismiss the forgery charge 
not simply on the ground that the writings were incomplete, but 
on the theory that defendant should have been charged under the 
prohibited use of a license statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133 
1990) (T. 14-18, 81-85). The essence of his motion was that 
section 41-2-133 is (1) more specific to the facts of this case 
and (2) prohibits the same conduct, thereby entitling defendant 
to face the possibility of the lesser punishment provided by that 
section (T. 14-17, 81-83). In support defendant cites State v. 
Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 345-46, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969) (doubt 
as to whether defendant should be punished under either Drug 
Abuse Control Law or Narcotic Drug Act, both providing for drug 
possession, entitled defendant to benefit of lesser penalty under 
former statute); and Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 
1979) (defendant not entitled to lesser penalty under forgery 
statute where passing of forged prescriptions more specifically 
provided for by Utah Controlled Substances Act). 
Defendant's reliance on Shondel and Helmuth is 
misplaced. In this case the trial court rejected both of 
defendant's approaches noting that defendant's "transfer" of 
writings, the focal point of the State's case, went beyond a 
common law interpretation of the forgery statute and was not even 
an element of section 41-2-133 (T. 84-85). Thus, the court 
properly recognized that the two statutes did not prohibit the 
same conduct and that defendant's conduct was actually more 
specially prohibited by the forgery statute than the prohibited 
12 
use of a license statute (T. 85). On such ground, the trial 
court correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss. 
POINT IV 
JUDGMENT FOR ATTEMPTED FORGERY MAY BE ENTERED 
IF EVIDENCE OF FORGERY IS FOUND INSUFFICIENT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1990) provides that if an 
appellate court determines the evidence insufficient to convict 
the defendant of the charged offense, it may enter judgment of 
conviction for the included offense if there is sufficient 
evidence supported by every fact required for conviction, if the 
defendant seeks such relief. The requirement of the defendant's 
See also Crick, 675 P.2d at 532 n.4, where in emphasizing that 
under the Baker standard evidence must provide not merely a 
rational basis to prove the lesser included offense but also a 
rational basis to acquit of the charged offense, the court 
stated: 
This conclusion is not contrary to State 
v. Shondelf 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 
(1969), and its progeny, which hold that 
where two statutes proscribe the same conduct 
but impose different penalties, the defendant 
is entitled to the lesser penalty. Recent 
cases stress that Shondel does not apply 
where the statutes do not prohibit the same 
conduct. Helmuth v. Morris, Utah 598 P.2d 
333 (1979), or where there is no doubt as to 
which of the two statutes is applicable to 
the facts of a particular case. State v. 
Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161 (1980). 
seeking judgment of conviction on the included offense has been 
satisfied where the defendant has admitted the requisite conduct. 
See State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985) (murder 
conviction set aside and judgment of conviction for manslaughter 
ordered where the defendant impliedly consented to reduction of 
charge by offering lesser included instruction for manslaughter 
and admitted requisite state of mind); State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 
717, 718 (Utah 1985) (conviction of distribution of cocaine 
vacated and conviction of attempt entered where the defendant 
admitted all the elements of an attempted sale of cocaine but 
sale was not completed). 
In this case, defendant has sought a lesser included 
instruction on attempted forgery. Every fact necessary to prove 
that crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and defendant has 
13 
admitted the criminal conduct. Therefore, should this Court 
determine that there is insufficient evidence to convict 
defendant of forgery because the permits were not complete, this 
Court may vacate and set aside the forgery conviction and remand 
the case for the entry of judgment of conviction for attempted 
forgery. 
Facts the jury necessarily found to prove defendant's 
attempted forgery are discussed above at 17 n.8 and 9. 
Additionally, defendant admitted that he sold the five partially 
complete permits to police undercover agents (defendant's 
"Memorandum In Support of Motion to Quash the Bindover" at R. 23; 
Appendix C). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
DATED this 7^ day of March, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-1-106. Strict construction rule not applicable. 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to 
this code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. 
All provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall 
be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and 
to effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included of-
fense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
41-2-133. Violation of license provisions. 
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to: 
(1) display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have in possession 
any license knowing it is fictitious or has been cancelled, revoked, sus-
pended, or altered; 
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a license issued to him, by a 
person not entitled to it; 
(3) display or to represent as his own a license not issued to him; 
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the division upon demand any license 
which has been suspended, canceled, or revoked; 
(5) use a false name or give a false address in any application for a 
license or any renewal or duplicate of the license, or to knowingly make a 
false statement, or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise 
commit a fraud in the application; or 
(6) permit any other prohibited use of a license issued to him. 
MODEL PENAL CODE 
ARTICLE 224. FORGERY AND FRAUDULENT 
PRACTICES 
Section 224.1. Forgery. 
(1) Definition. A person is guilty of forgery If, with purpose to 
defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating 
a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the acton 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or 
transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another 
who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at a 
time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact 
the case, or to be a eopy of an original when no such original 
existed; or 
(c) utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a man* 
ner specified in paragraphs (a) or (b). 
"Writing" includes printing or any other method of recording 
information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, 
badges, trade-marks, and other symbols of value, right, privilege, 
or identification. 
(2) Grading. Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the 
writing is or purports to be part of an issue of money, securities, 
postage or revenue stamps, or other instruments issued by the gov* 
eminent, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments 
representing interests in or claims against any property or enter-
prise. Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or 
purports to be a will, deed, contract, release, commercial instru-
ment, or other document evidencing, creating, transferring, alter* 
ing, terminating, or otherwise affecting legal relations. Other-
wise forgery is a misdemeanor. 
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APPENDIX C 
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR., #4619 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
: OF MOTION TO QUASH 
THE BINDOVER 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
• 
CHANNAN S. SINGH, : Case No. 901900431FS 
Judge RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Defendant. : 
FACTS 
Evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing indicated 
Mr. Singh possessed blank Driver License Temporary Counter 
Permits obtained from the Utah State Department of Public 
Safety. The Counter Permits, when properly filled out, may be 
used as either a temporary driving permit or an instruction 
(learner) permit. In the course of an undercover operation 
Singh sold five partially complete Counter Permits to Salt Lake 
Metro Narcotics Officers Mays and Wright. In each case Singh 
sold Counter Permits which were completed in part, but blank as 
to the name, address, date issued, birthdate, height, sex, 
weight, eye color, and signature of the licensee. 
